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Abstract
We study the problem of securely estimating the states of an unstable dynamical system subject
to nonstochastic disturbances. The estimator obtains all its information through an uncertain channel
which is subject to nonstochastic disturbances as well, and an eavesdropper obtains a disturbed version
of the channel inputs through a second uncertain channel. An encoder observes and block-encodes the
states in such a way that, upon sending the generated codeword, the estimator’s error is bounded and
such that a security criterion is satisfied ensuring that the eavesdropper obtains as little state information
as possible. Two security criteria are considered and discussed with the help of a numerical example. A
sufficient condition on the uncertain wiretap channel, i.e., the pair formed by the uncertain channel from
encoder to estimator and the uncertain channel from encoder to eavesdropper, is derived which ensures
that a bounded estimation error and security are achieved. This condition is also shown to be necessary
for a subclass of uncertain wiretap channels. To formulate the condition, the zero-error secrecy capacity
of uncertain wiretap channels is introduced, i.e., the maximal rate at which data can be transmitted from
the encoder to the estimator in such a way that the eavesdropper is unable to reconstruct the transmitted
data. Lastly, the zero-error secrecy capacity of uncertain wiretap channels is studied.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
With the increasing deployment and growing importance of cyber-physical systems, the ques-
tion of their security has recently become a focus of research activity in control theory [1]. One
central vulnerability of networked control or estimation is the communication channel from the
system which is to be controlled/estimated to the controller/estimator and possibly the feedback
channel. A possible attack on the channels is to actively interfere with transmitted information
with the goal of degrading the control or estimation performance. However, if the state of a
system is estimated remotely, e.g., in order to decide on the next control action at a remote
controller, another possible attack is eavesdropping. An adversary might have the chance to
overhear the transmitted information, to make its own state estimate and thus obtain sensitive
information. For example, if the system processes health information, leakage of its state might
breach privacy. If the system is a production line, knowledge of its state could be valuable
information for competitors or for criminals. This paper addresses the question how to protect
the transmitted information from such attackers.
We consider an unstable scalar, discrete-time, time-invariant linear system subject to non-
stochastic disturbances, where both the initial state and the disturbances are arbitrary elements
of a bounded interval. An estimator has the goal of estimating the system states in such a way
that the supremum over time of the absolute differences between the true state and its estimate
is bounded uniformly over all possible system state trajectories. We call this reliability. The
estimator does not have direct access to the system states. Instead, an encoder observes the
system state and is linked to the estimator through an uncertain channel, where every input
is disturbed in a nonstochastic manner and the input and output alphabets are possibly finite.
The encoder transforms blocks of state observations into codewords using an encoding function,
while the estimator applies a decoding function for estimating the system states from the channel
outputs. Together, the encoding and decoding functions form a transmission scheme.
Through another, different, uncertain channel, an adversary called the eavesdropper obtains a
disturbed version of the encoder’s channel input and hence information about the system state.
In addition to reliability, our goal is to make the information transmission from the encoder to
the estimator secure in such a way that the eavesdropper obtains as little information as possible
about the system state, in a sense to be defined. The main question of this paper is under which
conditions there exists a transmission scheme such that reliability and security are achieved
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Fig. 1. An unstable system has to be estimated remotely. It obtains state information through an uncertain wiretap channel. The
outputs obtained by an eavesdropper at the other channel output need to satisfy an operational security criterion.
simultaneously. See Fig. 1 for a sketch of the problem setting.
Contributions: We introduce the uncertain wiretap channel, defined as the pair consisting of
the uncertain channel from the encoder to the estimator and the uncertain channel from the
encoder to the eavesdropper. We also define the zero-error secrecy capacity of the uncertain
wiretap channel, which describes the maximal block encoding data rate such that not only the
estimator can decode the transmitted message, but at the same time the eavesdropper always has
at least two messages among which it cannot distinguish which one was actually transmitted.
We show that it either equals zero or the zero-error capacity of the uncertain channel between
encoder and estimator. The latter capacity was introduced by Shannon [2]. By definition, it is
the maximal rate at which, using block encoding, data can be transmitted from the encoder to
the estimator through the uncertain channel in such a way that every possible channel output is
generated by a unique message. A criterion to distinguish the cases of zero and positive zero-
error secrecy capacity can be given in a special case. For the study of the zero-error secrecy
capacity of uncertain wiretap channels, we introduce a hypergraph structure on the input alphabet
in addition to the graph structure which is applied in the study of the zero-error capacity of
uncertain channels and which also goes back to Shannon’s original paper [2].
With these information-theoretic tools, we address the main question formulated above. We
define two security criteria for secure estimation. The first, called d-security, is that there is
no possibility for the eavesdropper to process the data it receives in order to obtain a bounded
estimation error. The other security criterion is v-security, which requires that the volume of the
set of system states at a given time which are possible according to the eavesdropper’s information
should tend to infinity. We identify a sufficient condition which says that reliability and both d-
and v-security are achievable if the zero-error secrecy capacity of the uncertain wiretap channel
4is strictly larger than the logarithm of the coefficient of the unstable system. In the construction
of reliable and d- or v-secure transmission schemes, we separate quantization/estimation from
channel coding. We also give bounds on the speed of growth of the eavesdropper’s estimation
error and of the volume of the set of states at a given time which are possible according
to the eavesdropper’s information. A necessary condition for the simultaneous achievability of
reliability, d- and v-security can be given for a subclass of uncertain wiretap channels.
Related work: Good overviews over the area of estimation and control under information
constraints can be found in the introduction of [3] and in [4]. Matveev and Savkin [3] proved
that if the system and channel disturbances are stochastic and the estimator’s goal is to obtain an
almost surely bounded estimation error, the crucial property of the channel is its Shannon zero-
error capacity. This led Nair [5] to introduce a nonstochastic information theory for studying
the zero-error capacity of uncertain channels and to consider the problem of estimation and
control of linear unstable systems, where the information between sensor and estimator has to
be transmitted over an uncertain channel.
There exists a large body of work on information-theoretically secure communication, see [6]
and [7]. Stochastic wiretap channels were introduced by [8]. Security in the context of estimation
and control has so far mostly meant security against active adversaries, e.g., in [9], [10], [11],
[12], [13]. To our knowledge, only [14] and [15] have combined estimation and security against
a passive adversary for an unstable system so far. [14] considers general stochastic disturbances
in the system and a stochastic wiretap channel with Gaussian noise and uses a non-operational
security criterion based on entropy whose implications are not immediately clear. [15] considers a
linear system with Gaussian disturbances and Gaussian observation noise, whereas the stochastic
wiretap channel randomly and independently deletes input symbols. As a security criterion, [15]
requires that the eavesdropper’s estimation error tends to infinity.
Uncertain channels were introduced by Nair [5], but were previously considered implicitly in
the study of the zero-error capacity of channels with stochastic disturbances as introduced by
Shannon [2]. The calculation of the zero-error capacity is known as a difficult problem which
nowadays is mainly treated in graph theory [16].
Notation: The cardinality of a finite set A is denoted by ]A. If ]A = 1, we call A a singleton.
An interval I will also be written I = [Imin, Imax]. We define the length of I by |I|. For two
subsets A,B of the real numbers and a scalar λ, we set λA+ B := {λa+ b : a ∈ A, b ∈ B}. A
sequence (a(t))t1t=t0 is denoted by a(t0 : t1), where t1 is allowed to equal ∞.
5Outline: In Section II, uncertain wiretap channels are introduced and the main results concern-
ing their zero-error secrecy capacity are stated. The problem of secure estimation is formulated
and the corresponding results are presented in Section III. In Section IV, the quantizers applied
in this work are introduced and analyzed. This analysis is used in Section V for the proof of
the results on secure estimation. Section VI discusses d- and v-security, including a numerical
example. After the conclusion in Section VII, Appendix A contains the proofs of the results
concerning uncertain wiretap channels and some additional discussion, and Appendix B provides
the proofs from Section IV.
II. UNCERTAIN CHANNELS AND UNCERTAIN WIRETAP CHANNELS
Before we can present the model for secure estimation, we need to introduce the model for
data communication between the encoder and the receiving parties. This model is the uncertain
wiretap channel. Since it is new and since some results concerning uncertain wiretap channels
are relevant for secure estimation, we devote the complete section to this topic. Our model for
secure estimation will be defined in Section III.
1) Uncertain Channels: Let U ,V be arbitrary nonempty sets. An uncertain channel from U
to V is a mapping U : U → 2V∗ := 2V \ {∅}. For any u ∈ U , the set U(u) is the family of
all possible output values of the channel given the input u. When transmitting u, the output
of U will be exactly one element of U(u). That U(u) 6= ∅ for all u means that every input
generates an output. Note that every mapping ϕ : U → V can be regarded as an uncertain
channel Φ : U → 2V∗ with singletons as outputs, i.e., Φ(u) = {ϕ(u)}. Henceforth, we will not
make any notational difference between a mapping and the corresponding uncertain channel.
Remark 1. Note that there are no probabilistic weights on the elements of U(u). Thus U models
a channel with nonstochastic noise, where U(u) describes the effect of the noise if the input is
u.
We call the set ran(U) := ∪u∈UU(u) the range of U. Given two uncertain channels U1 :
U → 2V∗ and U2 : V → 2W∗ , then first applying U1 and then U2 leads to a new uncertain channel
U2 ◦U1 : U → 2W∗ called the composition of U1 and U2. Formally, we have for any u ∈ U
(U2 ◦U1)(u) := U2(U1(u)) :=
⋃
v∈U1(u)
U2(v).
Every uncertain channel U defines a reverse channel U−1 : ran(U)→ 2U∗ by
U−1(v) = {u ∈ U : v ∈ U(u)}.
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Fig. 2. (a) An uncertain channel T. If one sets F(0) = {a1},F(1) = {a3}, then F is a zero-error 2-code for T. (b) An uncertain
wiretap channel (TB ,TC). The uncertain channel F : {0, 1, 2} → 2A∗ defined by F(0) = {a1},F(1) = {a2, a3},F(2) = {a4}
is a zero-error wiretap 3-code for (TB ,TC).
Obviously, U−1 again is an uncertain channel.
Remark 2. We call U−1 the reverse instead of the inverse because usually, ]U−1(U(u)) > 1.
We have U−1(U(u)) = {u} for all u ∈ U if and only if every output v ∈ ran(U) is generated
by exactly one input u. If this is the case, we call U injective. If the uncertain channel U is
injective, then U−1 is an ordinary mapping, in the sense that U−1(v) is a singleton.
Given uncertain channels Ui : Ui → 2Vi∗ (1 ≤ i ≤ n), their product is the channel
U1 × · · · ×Un : U1 × · · · × Un −→ 2V1∗ × · · · × 2Vn∗ ,
(U1 × · · · ×Un)(u(1 :n)) = U1(u1)× · · · ×Un(un).
If U1 = . . . = Un =: U, we write U1×· · ·×Un =: Un. The reverse of U1×· · ·×Un is given
by U−11 × · · · ×U−1n . We write U−n for the reverse of Un.
2) Zero-Error Codes: An M -code on an alphabet A is a collection {F(m) : 0 ≤ m ≤M−1}
of nonempty and mutually disjoint subsets of A. This is equivalent to an uncertain channel
F : {0, . . . ,M − 1} → 2A∗ with disjoint output sets, so we will often denote such a code just by
F. The elements of ran(F) are called codewords. If ]F(m) = 1 for all 0 ≤ m ≤ M − 1, then
we call F a singleton code. Zero-error codes which are not singleton codes are introduced here
for the first time.
Let T : A → 2B∗ be an uncertain channel over which data are to be transmitted. A nonstochastic
M -code F on A is called a zero-error M -code for T if for any m,m′ ∈ {0, . . . ,M − 1} with
m 6= m′
T(F(m)) ∩T(F(m′)) = ∅. (1)
7Thus every possible channel output y ∈ ran(T◦F) can be associated to a unique message m. In
other words, the channel T ◦ F is injective, or equivalently, F−1 ◦T−1 is an ordinary mapping
associating to each output y the message F−1(T−1(y)) by which it was generated (cf. Remark
2). See Fig. 2(a) for an illustration.
3) Uncertain Wiretap Channels and Zero-Error Wiretap Codes: Given an additional finite
alphabet C, an uncertain wiretap channel is a pair of uncertain channels (TB : A → 2B∗ ,TC :
A → 2C∗). The interpretation is that the outputs of channel TB are received by an intended
receiver, whereas the outputs of TC are obtained by an eavesdropper who should not be able to
learn the data transmitted over TB.
An M -code F is called a zero-error wiretap M -code for (TB,TC) if it is a zero-error M -code
for TB and additionally
]F−1(T−1C (c)) ≥ 2 (2)
for every c ∈ ran(TC ◦ F). Thus every output c ∈ ran(TC ◦ F) can be generated by at least
two messages. Due to the lack of further information like stochastic weights on the messages
conditional on the output, the eavesdropper is unable to distinguish these messages. See Fig.
2(b) for an example.
4) Zero-Error Capacity and Zero-Error Secrecy Capacity: Given an uncertain channel T :
A → 2B∗ , an M -code F on An is called a zero-error (n,M)-code for T if it is a zero-error
M -code for Tn. We call n the blocklength of F. We set NT(n) to be the maximal M such that
there exists a zero-error (M,n)-code for T and define the zero-error capacity of T by
C0(T) := sup
n
logNT(n)
n
. (3)
Due to the superadditivity of the sequence logNT(0 :∞) and Fekete’s lemma [17], see also [18,
Lemma 11.2], the supremum on the right-hand side of (3) can be replaced by a limn→∞. Thus
C0(T) is the asymptotically largest exponential rate at which the number of messages which
can be transmitted through T free of error grows in the blocklength.
Given an uncertain wiretap channel (TB,TC), a zero-error (n,M)-code F for TB is called a
zero-error wiretap (n,M)-code for (TB,TC) if it is a zero-error wiretap M -code for (TnB,T
n
C).
We define N(TB ,TC)(n) to be the maximal M such that there exists a zero-error wiretap (M,n)-
8code for (TB,TC). If no zero-error wiretap (n,M)-code exists, we set N(TB ,TC)(n) = 1. The
zero-error secrecy capacity of (TB,TC) is defined as
C0(TB,TC) := sup
n
logN(TB ,TC)(n)
n
. (4)
Again by superadditivity and Fekete’s lemma [17], [18], the supremum in (4) can be replaced
by a limit. Obviously, C0(TB,TC) ≤ C0(TB).
5) Capacity Results: The zero-error capacity of general uncertain channels is unknown, only
a few special cases have been solved so far [16]. However, it is possible to relate the zero-error
secrecy capacity of an uncertain wiretap channel (TB,TC) to the zero-error capacity of TB in
a surprisingly simple way.
Theorem 1. The zero-error secrecy capacity of an uncertain wiretap channel (TB,TC) either
equals 0 or C0(TB).
The proof of this result can be found in Appendix A. The simple observation behind the proof is
that the possibility of sending one bit securely over (TB,TC) as a prefix to an arbitrary zero-error
code F for TB generates a zero-error wiretap code for (TB,TC) whose rate is approximately
the same as that of F.
What is missing in Theorem 1 is a necessary and sufficient criterion for the zero-error secrey
capacity to be positive. We can give one in the case that TB is injective and the input alphabet
is finite.
Theorem 2. Let (TB,TC) be an uncertain wiretap channel with finite input alphabet A such
that TB is injective. Then C0(TB,TC) = 0 if and only if N(TB ,TC)(1) = 1. If C0(TB,TC) > 0,
then C0(TB,TC) = log(]A).
The proof can be found in Appendix A. Theorem 2 gives a characterization of the positivity of
the zero-error secrecy capacity if TB is injective which only involves (TB,TC) at blocklength 1.
Its proof also contains a simple procedure for finding N(TB ,TC)(1). If TB is not injective, finding
N(TB ,TC)(1) is harder, but can be done by brute-force search for reasonably sized alphabets. More
importantly, if TB is not injective, it is possible that N(TB ,TC)(1) = 1 and C0(TB,TC) > 0, see
Example 3 in Appendix A. For general uncertain wiretap channels, one can use the procedure
from the proof of Theorem 2 to reduce a zero-error code for TB to a zero-error wiretap code.
However, the code thus generated might have rate 0 although C0(TB,TC) > 0. The question
9when C0(TB,TC) > 0 for general uncertain wiretap channels seems to be a hard problem and
has to be left open for now. Further discussion of zero-error secrecy capacity is included in
Appendix A.
6) Degree of Eavesdropper Ignorance: In order to measure the achieved degree of security
in greater detail, we introduce the number of messages that can generate a given eavesdropper
output as an additional parameter. We call a zero-error wiretap (n,M)-code a zero-error wiretap
(n,M, γ)-code if for every c(1 :n) ∈ ran(TnC ◦ F),
]F−1(T−nC (c(1 :n))) ≥ γ. (5)
Clearly, M ≥ γ ≥ 2. This parameter can be interpreted as a measure of the minimal eaves-
dropper’s confusion about the transmitted message guaranteed by the (n,M, γ)-code. It will be
important in the analysis of one of the security criteria we apply for secure estimation.
III. SECURE ESTIMATION OVER UNCERTAIN CHANNELS
A. The Model
Let I0 be a closed real interval and let Ω ≥ 0 and λ > 1 be real numbers such that |I0|+Ω > 0.
We then consider the real-valued time-invariant unstable linear system
x(t+ 1) = λx(t) + w(t), (6a)
x(0) ∈ I0. (6b)
The initial state x(0) can assume any value in I0 and is not known before its observation. The
noise sequence w(0 :∞) can be any sequence in [−Ω/2,Ω/2]∞. We call x(t) the system state
at time t. The system states are directly observable. Due to |I0| + Ω > 0, the system suffers
from nontrivial disturbances in the initial state or in the evolution. The set of possible system
trajectories x(0 : t) until time t is denoted by X0:t.
Assume that an entity called the encoder is located at the system output and at time t records
the corresponding system state x(t). At every system time step, it has the possibility of using
an uncertain wiretap channel (TB : A → 2B∗ ,TC : A → 2C∗) exactly once, i.e., the system (6)
and the channel are synchronous. At the output of TB, an estimator has the task of obtaining
reliable estimates of the system states. An eavesdropper has access to the outputs of TC which
should satisfy a security criterion.
10
At time t, the encoder only knows x(0 : t) and the system dynamics (6), i.e., it has no acausal
knowledge of future states. The estimator and the eavesdropper know the system dynamics (6),
but the only information about the actual system states they have is what they receive from
the encoder through TB and TC , respectively. The eavesdropper also knows the transmission
protocol applied by encoder and estimator.
The encoder also has knowledge of the complete uncertain wiretap channel, in particular the
characteristics of the uncertain channel to the eavesdropper. This knowledge can be justified by
assuming that the eavesdropper is part of the communication network without access rights for
the system state, e.g., an “honest but curious” node in the home network. Uncertain wiretap
channels can also be regarded as models of stochastic wiretap channels where the transition
probabilities are unknown. In the other direction, there exist information-theoretic techniques for
wiretap channels which do not require precise knowledge about the channel to the eavesdropper,
but the case with eavesdropper channel knowledge serves as a building block and as a benchmark
[19], [20].
The allowed protocols are defined next.
Definition 1. A transmission scheme consists of a positive integer n called the blocklength of
the transmission scheme together with a sequence of pairs (fk, ϕk)∞k=0. Setting τk := kn+ 1 and
tk := (k + 1)n, for every k ≥ 0
• the k-th encoding function fk : X0:τk−1 → 2An∗ is an uncertain channel,
• the first decoding function ϕ1 : Bn → R is an ordinary mapping,
• for k ≥ 2, the k-th decoding function ϕk : Btk → Rn is an ordinary mapping.
The concept is illustrated in Fig. 3. The encoding function fk takes the system path x(0 :τk−1)
until time τk − 1 as input and maps this into a codeword of length n. The blocks of new
observations also have length n, except for the first one of length 1. Thus the initial state gets a
special treatment, but this is a technical detail the reason of which will become clear in the proof
of Theorem 3 below. We allow fk to be an uncertain channel for two reasons. One is that we
do not have to distinguish between open and closed quantizing sets—if a path or state is on the
boundary, we make an uncertain decision. The more important reason is that uncertain encoding
has to be allowed in order for uncertain wiretap channels to achieve capacity, see Example 2 in
Appendix A.
The decoder ϕk takes the first tk outputs of TB and calculates an estimate of the states
11
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Fig. 3. The k-th step of a transmission scheme (fk, ϕk)∞k=0 with blocklength n.
x(τk−1), . . . , x(τk−1) (where we set τ−1 = 0), which have not been estimated before. When we
define the performance criterion for a transmission scheme, it will be seen that by not allowing
ϕk to be an uncertain channel we do not lose generality.
Next we come to the definition of reliability and security of a transmission scheme (fk, ϕk)∞k=0.
Every such transmission scheme induces the (uncertain) channels
f0:k := f0 × · · · × fk, ϕ0:k := ϕ0 × · · · × ϕk.
Observe that, given a sequence xˆ(0 :τk − 1) of system estimates, i.e., of outputs of ϕ0:k, we can
write the set of system states which can generate this output sequence as (f−10:k ◦T−tkB ◦ϕ−10:k)(xˆ(0 :
τk − 1)).
Let T be a positive integer or ∞. The ∞-norm of a real sequence y(0 :T ) is given by
‖y(0 :T )‖∞ :=
max0≤t≤T |y(t)| if T <∞,sup0≤t<∞|y(t)| if T =∞.
For a set E ⊂ RT+1, where T is a positive integer or infinity, we define its diameter by
diamT+1(E)
:= sup{‖y(0 :T )− y′(0 :T )‖∞ : y(0 :T ), y′(0 :T ) ∈ E}.
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Definition 2. The transmission scheme (fk, ϕk)∞k=0 is called reliable if the estimation error is
bounded uniformly in the estimates, i.e., if there exists a constant κ > 0 such that for every
possible1 xˆ(0 :∞) ∈ ran(ϕ0:∞ ◦T∞B ◦ f0:∞),
sup
k
diamτk
(
(f−10:k ◦T−tkB ◦ ϕ−10:k)(xˆ(0 :τk − 1))
) ≤ κ. (7)
Remark 3. One would not gain anything by allowing the decoding functions ϕk to be uncertain
channels since this generalization could only increase the left-hand side of (7).
A transmission scheme only defines a decoder at the output of the estimator’s channel TB. But
every system path x(0 :∞) also generates a sequence c(0 :∞) ∈ T∞C (f0:∞(x(0 :∞))) of outputs
obtained by the eavesdropper. The two security criteria we define next require state information
to be secure no matter how the eavesdropper further processes its channel output sequence. The
first criterion just ensures that the eavesdropper’s estimation error grows unbounded with time.
Definition 3. The transmission scheme (fk, ϕk)∞k=0 is called d-secure if there exists a function
δ(k) with
diamτk
(
(f−10:k ◦T−tkC )(c(0 : tk − 1))
) ≥ δ(k)
for all c(0 :∞) ∈ ran(T∞C ◦ f0:∞) and δ(k)→∞ as k →∞.
Upon receiving any sequence c(0 :∞) of channel outputs generated by a d-secure transmission
scheme, the eavesdropper’s estimate of the system path x(0 :∞) that generated c(0 :∞) grows
to infinity2 uniformly in c(0 :∞). Note that since X0:t is bounded for every t ≥ 0, the diameter
of (f−10:k ◦ T−tkC )(c(0 : tk − 1)) cannot be infinite for any k. Thus the eavesdropper’s estimation
error will always be finite, though increasingly large, in finite time.
Next one can ask the question how many system paths could be the possible generators of
an eavesdropper sequence c(0 :∞). This is considered in the following secrecy criterion. For a
set E of real sequences of finite length T + 1 and 0 ≤ t ≤ T , we write E|t := {x ∈ R : x =
1Due to the application of the ∞-norm, the reliability criterion is a “pointwise” criterion. Using p-norms of the form ‖y(0 :
T )‖p := (∑Tt=0|y(t)|p)1/p for some 1 ≤ p < ∞ would always lead to an infinite estimation error if Ω > 0 and TB can
transmit at most a finite number of messages in finite time, since the sequence |x(t)− xˆ(t)| : t ≥ 0 would not tend to zero for
all state sequences x(0 :∞).
2Note that d-security as defined via the∞-norm is stronger than the analogous criteria with the p-norm instead of the∞-norm
for all 1 ≤ p <∞ because ‖x(0 :∞)‖∞ ≤ ‖x(0 :∞)‖p.
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x(t) for some x(0 :T ) ∈ E}. The volume vol(E ′) of a subset E ′ of the real numbers is measured
in terms of the Lebesgue measure.
Definition 4. A transmission scheme (fk, ϕk)∞k=0 is called v-secure if there exists a function ν(k)
such that
vol((f−10:k ◦T−tkC )(c(0 : tk − 1))|τk−1) ≥ ν(k)
for all c(0 :∞) ∈ ran(T∞C ◦ f0:∞) and ν(k)→∞ as k →∞.
Like in the definition of d-security, we require uniform divergence to infinity. Since X0:t is
bounded for all t ≥ 0, the volume in Definition 4 cannot be infinite in finite time.
Remark 4. Clearly, v-security implies d-security. The volume is measured at time τk−1 because
it would trivially tend to infinity if the τk-dimensional volume of the set (f−10:k ◦T−tkC )(c(0 : tk−1))
were measured. If the volume of the set of states tends to infinity along τk−1 as k →∞, then the
same holds for the volume measured at all other infinite, increasing sequences of time instances.
B. Results for Secure Estimation
We first state a sufficient condition the uncertain wiretap channel has to satisfy in order for
reliability as well as d- or v-security to be possible.
Theorem 3. There exists a transmission scheme which is reliable, d-secure and v-secure if
C0(TB,TC) > log λ.
The proof of Theorem 3 can be found in Section V-A. The transmission schemes applied there
separate quantization/estimation from coding for uncertain wiretap channels by concatenating a
quantizer defined below with a wiretap zero-error code. Note that the condition C0(TB,TC) > 0
is weak: Nair [5] proved that C0(TB) > log λ is sufficient and C0(TB) ≥ log λ is necessary
to achieve reliability. Thus by Theorem 1, the additional requirement in Theorem 3 is nothing
but C0(TB,TC) > 0. This is the minimal condition one would expect to be necessary to also
achieve security. For general (TB,TC) we do not know that C0(TB,TC) > 0 really has to be
satisfied for secure estimation to be possible.
For injective channels, however, the condition from Theorem 3 is “almost” necessary to achieve
reliability and d-security, hence also for v-security.
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Theorem 4. If TB is injective and C finite, then the existence of a reliable and d-secure
transmission scheme implies ]A ≥ λ and C0(TB,TC) > 0.
The proof of this theorem can be found in Section V-B. Since TB is injective, the condition
]A ≥ λ means nothing but C0(TB) ≥ log λ. As noted above, C0(TB) ≥ log λ was shown
by Nair [5] to follow from reliability for general uncertain channels. The additional condition
C0(TB,TC) > 0, which follows from d-security, implies C0(TB,TC) ≥ log λ by Theorem 1.
The problem of finding a tight necessary condition for secure estimation over general uncertain
wiretap channels (TB,TC) remains open. We conjecture that it depends on a criterion for
C0(TB,TC) to be positive. We only have such a criterion in the case that TB is injective
from Theorem 2.
As a refinement of Theorem 3, we have a closer look at the exponential rate at which the
estimation error or the volume of the set of states at a given time which are possible according
to the eavesdropper’s information tend to infinity. The higher the speed of divergence, the higher
is the degree of security.
Lemma 1. There exists a reliable transmission scheme (fk, ϕk)∞k=0 such that for every c(0 :∞) ∈
ran(T∞C ◦ f0:∞) there exist system paths x(0 :∞), x′(0 :∞) ∈ (f−10:∞ ◦T−∞C )(c(0 :∞)) satisfying
lim
t→∞
log‖x(0 : t)− x′(0 : t)‖∞
t
= log λ. (8)
This lemma is proved in Section V-A3. Clearly, log λ is the largest exponential rate at which
two trajectories can diverge. For v-security, the speed of increase of the volume of the set
of possible states according to the eavesdropper’s information will in general increase at an
exponential rate smaller than log λ.
Lemma 2. For every zero-error wiretap (n,M, γ)-code F, upon setting
logM
n
=: R,
log γ
n
=: Γ, (9)
there exists a reliable transmission scheme (fk, ϕk)∞k=0 with blocklength n such that for all
c(0 :∞) ∈ ran(T∞C ◦ f0:∞),
lim
k→∞
log vol((f−10:k ◦T−tkC )(c(0 : tk − 1))|τk−1)
τk
≥
Γ + log λ−R if Ω = 0,Γ log λ
R+2 log λ+εn
if Ω > 0,
(10)
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where εn = εn(R, λ) is positive and εn → 0 as n→∞.
This lemma is proved in Section V-A. For Ω = 0, a positive rate is achievable by choosing
R < Γ + log λ. Lemmas 1 and 2 are discussed in detail in Section VI.
IV. QUANTIZER ANALYSIS
Both Lemmas 1 and 2 follow from analyzing the transmission scheme we apply in the proof
of Theorem 3. For proving Theorem 3, we separate quantization/estimation from channel coding.
Next, we will therefore describe the quantizer used in the proof of Theorem 3. More precisely,
we analyze the behavior of the system (6) with an appropriate quantization of every single state
x(t). Later, when concatenating the quantizer with a channel code of blocklength n > 1, we
will use an analogous quantizer for the n-sampled version of (6).
Definition 5. Consider the system (6) and let M ≥ 2 be an integer, called the number of
quantizer levels. Let xˆ(m(0 :−1)) be the mid point of I(m(0 :−1)) := I0. For every integer
t ≥ 0 and every sequence m(0 : t) ∈ {0, . . . ,M − 1}t+1, we then recursively set
P(m(0 : t)) := I(m(0 : t− 1))min
+
|I(m(0 : t− 1))|
M
[m(t),m(t) + 1] , (11)
xˆ(m(0 : t)) := mid point of P(m(0 : t)), (12)
I(m(0 : t)) := λP(m(0 : t)) +
[
−Ω
2
,
Ω
2
]
. (13)
(in (11), recall our notation for intervals). Finally we define for every t ≥ 0 the t-th quantizer
channel, an uncertain channel Qt which maps any message sequence m(0 : t − 1) and any
x(t) ∈ I(m(0 : t− 1)) to an element of
Qt(x(t),m(0 : t−1))={m :x(t)∈P(m(0 : t−1),m)}. (14)
The sets P(·) will be referred to as quantizer intervals. The numbers 0, . . . ,M−1 are messages.
Equations (11)-(14) define the quantizer of the system (6) with M quantizer levels.
Every state sequence x(0 : ∞) generates a message sequence m(0 : ∞) via the uncertain
channels Qt. Assume that the state sequence x(0 : t − 1) has generated message sequence
m(0 : t − 1) until time t − 1. The interval I(m(0 : t − 1)) consists of all states x(t) which
are possible in the next time step. Upon observation of x(t), the message m(t) is generated
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as an element3 of Qt(x(t),m(0 : t − 1)). From the sequence m(0 : t) one can then infer that
x(t) ∈ P(m(0 : t)). Accordingly, the estimate of x(t) is xˆ(m(0 : t)). Note that for every message
sequence m(0 :∞) there exists a system path x(0 :∞) which generates m(0 :∞).
Most of the quantizer analysis we do in the following serves the proof of Lemma 2. We are
interested in the disjointness of quantizer intervals at a given time in order to find a lower bound
on the volume of the set of states which are possible according to the eavesdropper’s information:
If a set of quantizer intervals at a common time instant is disjoint, the volume covered by their
union equals the sum over their individual volumes. Thus two questions need to be answered: 1)
What is the volume of a quantizer interval? 2) How many disjoint quantizer intervals are there
(from the eavesdropper’s view)? An answer to the first question is the following lemma.
Lemma 3. If λ 6= M , then for every t ∈ N and m(0 : t) ∈ {0, . . . ,M − 1}t+1 we have
|P(m(0 : t))| = λ
t
M t
( |I0|
M
− Ω
M − λ
)
+
Ω
M − λ. (15)
In particular, we have supt|P(m(0 : t))| < ∞ for every infinite message sequence m(0 :∞) if
λ < M . In that case
sup
t≥0
|P(m(0 : t))| = max
{ |I0|
M
,
Ω
M − λ
}
.
Further, the length of P(m(0 : t)) only depends on t, not on m(0 : t). Thus we can define
`t := |P(m(0 : t))|. (16)
The proof can be found in Appendix B. Lemma 3 not only is useful in the security analysis,
but it also essentially establishes reliability for M > λ, a result which of course is not surprising
in view of the existing literature. Concerning question 2), life is simple in the case Ω = 0 because
of the following lemma.
Lemma 4. If Ω = 0, then at each time t ≥ 0, the interiors of the intervals P(m(0 : t)) are
disjoint, where m(0 : t) ranges over {0, . . . ,M − 1}t+1.
For the proof, see Appendix B. Thus at time t, we have M t+1 disjoint quantizer intervals of
the same length. If Ω > 0, then the situation is more complicated: Quantizer intervals belonging
3m(t) is not determined deterministically from x(t) and m(0 : t−1) because in this way we can have all intervals P(m(0 : t))
closed. Note that ]Qt(x(t),m(0 : t− 1)) ≥ 2 only if x(t) is on the boundary of two neighboring quantizer intervals.
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to different message sequences of the same length can overlap. This is the reason for the two
different lower bounds on the rate of volume increase in (10).
Example 1. Consider the system (6) with λ = 1.2, Ω = .1, I0 = [−1, 1] and its quantizer with
M = 3. Then P(0) = [−1,−1/3] and P(1) = [−1/3,+1/3]. In the next time step, one has
P(0, 1) = [−.6,−.35] , P(1, 0) = [−.45,−.15] ,
so P(0, 1) and P(1, 0) are not disjoint. The closer a state x(t) is to the origin (and the larger
t), the more paths there are which can be in this particular state at time t.
Example 1 shows that one can only hope to obtain disjoint quantizer sets for a strict subset of
all message sequences. To find such a subset, we derive an important formula for the sequence
xˆ(m(0 :∞)) given a message sequence m(0 :∞).
Lemma 5. Consider the system (6) and consider the quantizer for (6) with M quantizer levels.
Let m(0 :∞) be a message sequence. Then for every t = 0, 1, 2, . . .
xˆ(m(0 : t))
= λt
{
xˆ(m(0 :−1))
+
1
2
t∑
i=0
(
ΩM
M−λ
(
1
λi
− 1
M i
)
+
|I0|
M i
)(
2m(i)+1
M
−1
)}
. (17)
See Appendix B for the proof. In order to find disjoint quantizer intervals, the idea is to look
at the distance between points xˆ(m(0 : t)) and xˆ(m′(0 : t)) and ask how the distances between
the estimate sequences will evolve in the future.
Lemma 6. Assume that M > λ. Let m(0 :∞),m′(0 :∞) be two message sequences and let
T ≥ 0. If
|xˆ(m(0 :T ))− xˆ(m′(0 :T ))| ≥ Ω
M − λ
M − 1
λ− 1 + `T , (18)
then for every t ≥ 0, the interiors of the intervals P(m(0 : T + t)) and P(m′(0 : T + t)) are
disjoint.
The proof can be found in Appendix B. Finally, assume that at each time instant at least
γ different messages are possible according to the eavesdropper’s view. For every t ≥ 0 let
Mt := {mt,1 < mt,2 < . . . < mt,γ} ⊆ {0, . . . ,M − 1} be a subset of the possible messages at
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time t which has exactly γ elements. In particular, Mt may differ from Mt′ for t 6= t′. Now fix
a T ≥ 1. For j ≥ 1 and ξ(1 :j) ∈ {1, . . . , γ}j , we define the message sequence mξ(1:j)(0 :jT −1)
by
mξ(1:j)(s) = ms,ξ(i) ∈Ms
if 1 ≤ i ≤ j and (i− 1)T ≤ s ≤ iT − 1. On the j-th block of times (j − 1)T, . . . , jT − 1, the
sequences mξ(1:j)(0 : jT − 1), where ξ(1 : j − 1) is kept fixed and ξ(j) ranges over {1, . . . , γ},
are an ordered set of γ message sequences with the order induced by componentwise ordering.
The corresponding quantizer intervals P(mξ(1:j)(0 :jT − 1)), where 1 ≤ ξ(j) ≤ γ, will therefore
diverge due to the instability of the system (6). The following lemma is proved in Appendix B.
Lemma 7. Let Ω > 0 and M > λ and choose a T ∈ N satisfying
T ≥ 1 + log(M − 1) + log(M + λ− 1)− log(M − λ)
log λ
(19)
Then for every j ≥ 1, the interiors of the sets P(mξ(1:j)(0 :jT − 1)), where ξ(1 :j) ranges over
{1, . . . γ}j , are disjoint.
Thus we have obtained a lower bound on the number of disjoint quantizer intervals at times
t = jT − 1, for positive j. This will be sufficient when we put everything together in the next
section to prove v-security and obtain the lower bound of Lemma 2 for the case Ω > 0.
V. SECURE ESTIMATION – PROOFS
A. Proof of Theorem 3 and Lemmas 1 and 2
1) Definition of the Transmission Scheme: We start by defining a transmission scheme (fk, ϕk)∞k=0.
We choose its blocklength n such that M := N(TB ,TC)(n) > λ
n, which is possible because
C0(TB,TC) > log λ. Let γ ≥ 2 be chosen such that there exists a zero-error wiretap (n,M, γ)-
code F.
Since we use the channel in blocks of length n, we also observe the system only at intervals
of length n. If we look at the outputs of (6) at times 0, n, 2n, . . ., we obtain a new dynamical
system which satisfies
x(n)(k + 1) = λnx(n)(k) + w(n)(k), (20a)
x(n)(0) ∈ I0, (20b)
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where
w(n)(k) =
n−1∑
j=0
λn−j−1w(kn+ j).
Note that w(n)(k) is a nonstochastic disturbance in the range [−Ω(n)/2,Ω(n)/2] for
Ω(n) =
Ω
λ− 1(λ
n − 1). (21)
Therefore the quantizer for (20) with M quantization levels is well-defined as in Definition 5
and all results derived in the previous section for (6) and its quantizer carry over to (20) with
the obvious modifications of the parameters.
We define the encoding and decoding functions of our transmission scheme by separating
quantization/estimation from channel coding like it has been done frequently in settings without
security, e.g., [21]. For every k ≥ 0, let Q(n)k be the k-th quantizer channel of the quantizer of
(20) (see (14)). The transmission scheme is defined by recursively concatenating the Q(n)k with
F. We set f0(x(0)) = F(Q
(n)
0 (x(0))) and for k ≥ 1, assuming that the quantizer channels have
produced the message sequence m(0 :k − 1) so far, we set
fk(x(0 :τk − 1)) = F(Q(n)k (x(n)(k),m(0 :k − 1))).
For the definition of the decoding functions, recall that F is a zero-error code. Thus for every k ≥
0 and b(0 : tk−1) ∈ ran(TtkB ◦Fk+1), the set (F−(k+1) ◦T−tkB )(b(0 : tk−1)) contains precisely one
element, namely the message sequence m(0 :k) sent by the encoder. The 0-th decoding function
has a 1-dimensional output which is defined by ϕ0(b(0 : t0−1)) = xˆ(n)((F−1◦T−t0B )(b(0 : t0−1))).
Here xˆ(n)(m(0 : k)) for any m(0 : k) is the mid point of the quantizer interval P(n)(m(0 : k))
belonging to the quantizer of (20). For k ≥ 1, the output of the k-th decoding function ϕk
is n-dimensional. If, with a little abuse of notation, we write ϕk(b(0 : tk − 1)) =: (xˆτk−1(b(0 :
tk − 1)), . . . , xˆτk−1(b(0 : tk − 1))), then we set
xˆτk−1(b(0 : tk − 1)) = xˆ(n)((F−(k+1) ◦T−tkB )(b(0 : tk − 1))).
Since (6) does not grow to infinity in finite time, the values xˆτk−1(b(0 : tk − 1)), . . . , xˆτk−2(b(0 :
tk − 1)) can be defined in an arbitrary way as long as their distance from xˆτk−1(b(0 : tk − 1)) is
uniformly bounded in k and b(0 :∞).
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2) Reliability: Although it is not surprising and well-known in the literature, for completeness
we show the reliability of the transmission scheme. Since the states of (6) cannot diverge to
infinity in finite time, we only need to make sure that the estimation errors at the observation
times τ0 − 1, τ1 − 1, . . . are bounded. To see this, let k ≥ 0 and m(0 :k) any message sequence
and observe that
(f−10:k ◦T−tkB ◦ ϕ−10:k)(xˆ(n)(m(0 :k)))|τk−1 = P(n)(m(0 :k)).
Since M > λn, the length of P(n)(m(0 : k)) is bounded by Lemma 3. This shows that the
transmission scheme is reliable.
3) d-Security and Lemma 1: Let c(0 :∞) ∈ ran(T∞C ◦f0:∞). Let m(0) 6= m′(0) ∈ F−1(T−nC (c(0 :
t0 − 1))) and m(k) ∈ F(T−nC (c(tk−1 : tk − 1))). Then there are two system trajectories x(0 :
∞), x′(0 :∞) such that x(τk − 1) = xˆ(n)(m(0 :k)) and x′(τk − 1) = xˆ(n)(m′(0)m(1 :k)) for all
k ≥ 0. With Lemma 5 one immediately sees that x(0 :∞) and x′(0 :∞) diverge at exponential
rate log λ. Thus x(0 :∞), x′(0 :∞) satisfy (8). This proves Lemma 1 and the achievability of
d-security.
4) v-Security and Lemma 2: For the proof of v-security of the transmission scheme, we
consider the two subcases Ω = 0 and Ω > 0. We first assume Ω = 0, hence |I0| > 0. In this
case, hardly anything remains to be proved. By Lemma 4, for given k ≥ 0, the interiors of all
P(n)(m(0 :k)) are disjoint. Now assume that the eavesdropper receives the sequence c(0 : tk−1).
Since F is a (n,M, γ)-code, ](F−(k+1) ◦T−tkC )(c(0 : tk − 1)) ≥ γk+1. Hence
vol((f−10:k ◦T−tkC )(c(0 : tk − 1))|τk−1)
=
∑
m(0:k)∈(F−(k+1)◦T−tkC )(c(0:tk−1))
`
(n)
k
≥ γk+1`(n)k =
(
γλn
M
)k
γ|I0|
M
,
where `(n)k is the length of the quantizer intervals at time k of the quantizer of (20). This gives
the possibly negative growth rate (log γ)/n + log λ − (logM)/n, as claimed in Lemma 2 for
the case Ω = 0. Since (logM)/n can be chosen strictly smaller than (log γ)/n+ log λ, this also
proves that v-security is achievable for Ω = 0, and thus completes the proof of Theorem 3 for
the case Ω = 0.
Next we assume that Ω > 0. Define
T (n) :=
⌈
1 +
logM
n log λ
+
log(M + λn)− log(M − λn)
n log λ
⌉
.
21
Choose a j ≥ 1 and set k(j) := jT (n)−1. Let c(0 : tk(j)−1) be an eavesdropper output sequence.
Then by choice of F
](F−(k(j)+1) ◦T−tk(j)C )(c(0 : tk(j) − 1)) ≥ γk(j)+1. (22)
T (n) satisfies (19) for (20). By Lemma 7 applied to (20), within the set on the left-hand side of
(22), the γj message sequences of the form mξ(1:j)(0 :k(j)) produce sets P(n)(mξ(1:j)(0 :k(j)))
with disjoint interiors. Therefore
vol((f−10:k(j) ◦T
−tk(j)
C )(c(0 : tk(j) − 1))|τk(j)−1)
≥
∑
ξ(1:j)∈{1,...,γ}j
`
(n)
k(j) = γ
j`
(n)
k(j). (23)
Since `(n)k(j) tends to a constant as j tends to infinity, the asymptotic rate of volume growth is
lower bounded by
lim
k→∞
log(γj`
(n)
k(j))
τk
=
log γ
nT (n)
.
With the notation (9) and setting
εn :=
log(M + λn)− log(M − λn)
n
,
we obtain
log γ
nT (n)
≥ Γ log λ
R + 2 log λ+ εn
.
Clearly, εn is positive and tends to 0 as n tends to infinity. This proves that v-security can
be achieved in the case Ω > 0 as well, and at the rate claimed in Lemma 2. Altogether, this
completes the proof of Theorem 3 and Lemmas 1 and 2.
B. Proof of Theorem 4
Assume that TB is injective and C is finite. Let (fk, ϕk)∞k=0 be a reliable and d-secure
transmission scheme with blocklength n. In particular, choose κ > 0 in such a way that (7)
is satisfied for every possible sequence of estimates xˆ(0 :∞). The necessity of C0(TB) ≥ log λ
was shown in [5]. Due to the injectivity of TB, this condition can be reformulated as ]A ≥ λ.
It remains to show that C0(TB,TC) > 0.
By the uniform divergence requirement in the definition of d-security, it is possible to choose
a k such that
diamτk((f
−1
0:k ◦T−tkC )(c(0 : tk − 1))) > κ (24)
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for every c(0 : tk − 1) ∈ ran(TtkC ◦ f0:k). Let c˜(0 : tk − 1) ∈ ran(TtkC ◦ f0:k). Recursively, we
define the sets T0(c˜(0 : tk − 1)) := ran(f0:k) ∩ T−tkC (c˜(0 : tk − 1)) and Tj(c˜(0 : tk − 1)) :=
ran(f0:k) ∩ (T−tkC ◦TtkC )(Tj−1(c˜(0 : tk − 1))) for j ≥ 1. Let j∗ be the maximal j which satisfies4
Tj(c˜(0 : tk − 1)) ) Tj−1(c˜(0 : tk − 1)). If a0(0 : tk − 1), . . . , aM−1(0 : tk − 1) is an enumeration of
the elements of Tj∗(c˜(0 : tk−1)), then the (M, tk)-code Gk defined by Gk(m) = {am(0 : tk−1)}
is a zero-error code. This is due to the injectivity of TB.
But Gk even is a wiretap zero-error code. To show this, let c(0 : tk− 1) ∈ ran(TtkC ◦Gk). The
definition of j∗ implies that T
−tk
C (c(0 : tk − 1)) ⊆ Tj∗(c˜(0 : tk − 1)) = ran(Gk). Due to (24) and
since (fk, ϕk)∞k=0 satisfies (7), we have ](G
−1
k ◦T−tkC )(c(0 : tk − 1)) = ]T−tkC (c(0 : tk − 1)) ≥ 2.
Hence c(0 : tk − 1) can be generated by at least two different messages. This implies that Gk
also is a wiretap zero-error code, hence C0(TB,TC) > 0.
VI. DISCUSSION: D- AND V-SECURITY
We have a closer look at d- and v-security, in particular the rates derived in Lemmas 1 and 2.
First consider the system (6) with Ω = 0. Let (TB,TC) be any uncertain wiretap channel and F
an (n,M, γ)-code for (TB,TC). Then the proof of Lemma 2 shows that the lower bound on the
right-hand side of (10) is tight. On the other hand, the growth rate log λ of the eavesdropper’s
estimation error derived in Lemma 1 will in general be strictly larger. This means that the set
(f−10:k ◦T−tkC )(c(0 : tk − 1)) is not connected, i.e., it has holes.
If Ω > 0, we have seen in Example 1 and the proof of Lemma 2 that the situation is more
complicated than for Ω = 0. For an illustration, let (TB,TC) and F be the channel and code
from Fig. 2(b). Assume the system (6) with λ = 1.2, I0 = [−1, 1] and Ω = 1.2. As in the proof
of Theorem 3, we construct a blocklength-1 transmission scheme (fk, ϕk)∞k=0 by concatenating
the quantizer for (6) with F by mapping the quantizer message m to F(m). For example, if
x(0) ∈ [1/3, 1], the quantizer outputs message 2, which F maps to the set F(2) = {a4}. Sending
a4 through TC generates the output c2, from which the eavesdropper concludes that message
1 or 2 has been sent. By choice of parameters, the length of the quantizer intervals remains
constant over time. Fig. 4 illustrates this situation under the assumption that the eavesdropper
receives the symbols c(0 :7) = c2c1c2c1c1c2c2c1. There are 28 possible message sequences from
4Without going into the details, we would like to mention here that Tj∗(c(0 : tk − 1)) is an equivalence class in the taxicab
partition of the joint range of f0:k and the corresponding outputs of TC , see [5].
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Fig. 4. The state space of (6) with parameters as in the text. The thick grey lines mark the outer bounds of the state space.
For the received eavesdropper sequence c(0 :7) as in the text, the vertical black lines show the set of states which are possible
according to the eavesdropper’s view. Further, for four possible message sequences m(0 : 7), the evolution of the corresponding
P(m(0 : 7)) is shown for illustration purposes.
the eavesdropper’s point of view, one of which corresponds to the actual sequence generated by
the quantizer. Notice the growth of vol((f−10:7 ◦ T−8C )(c(0 : 7))), which also implies the growth
of the eavesdropper’s estimation error in the sense of d-security. Further observe how quantizer
intervals overlap and even “cross paths”.
Generally, if Ω > 0 and Γ = R, then the eavesdropper has no information about the transmitted
message, and vol((f−10:k ◦T−tkC )(c(0 : tk − 1))) grows at rate log λ. The ratio of the left- and the
right-hand side of (10) tends to 1 as λ↘ 1. Thus the lower bound of Lemma 2 is asymptotically
tight for λ tending to the boundary of the instability region.
Moreover, the lower bound (10) for Ω > 0 is independent of Ω and of I0. This behavior can
be expected by the asymptotic dominance of λ in the system dynamics. Fig. 5 shows numerical
evidence for the correctness of this independence. For the system parameters, we fix λ = 1.2
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and consider four variations of Ω and I0 as shown in Fig. 5. We assume the same uncertain
wiretap channel as in Fig. 4 and apply the same blocklength-1 transmission scheme. Because
of the symmetry of the channel and the transmission scheme, vol((f−10:k ◦ T−(k+1)C )(c(0 : k)))
is independent of the eavesdropper’s received sequence and can be calculated in closed form.
For each of the four combinations of Ω and I0 we plot the ratio of the left-hand side of (10)
(“empirical rate”) and the right-hand side of (10) (“rate”) versus time. After different initial
values mainly due to the differing lengths of the initial interval, the ratios converge. At time
100, the maximal absolute value of all differences between them equals 0.417, at time 1000 it
reduces to 0.042.
The maximum ratio of empirical rate and rate in the previous example at time 1000 equals
3.36, quite a bit away from 1. This is due to the fact that vol((f−10:k ◦ T−(k+1)C )(c(0 :k))) grows
at rate log λ. The reason for this is that the symmetry of the situation allows without loss of
generality to assume that the eavesdropper always receives the symbol c1. The volume of states
compatible with this sequence is essentially given by the difference of the largest and smallest
paths which are possible according to this information, which by Lemma 5 grows at rate log λ.
Since the extreme paths compatible with a given eavesdropper information always diverge at
rate log λ by Lemma 1, a smaller volume growth rate is only possible if there are gaps in the
set of possible states, as occur in the case Ω = 0 (see above). We expect these gaps to increase
if the difference between Γ and R increases.
A major problem for the general analysis of vol((f−10:k ◦ T−tkC )(c(0 : tk − 1))) is that a brute-
force approach quickly becomes infeasible because with every secure transmission scheme, at
least 2t+1 different message sequences are possible at time t from the eavesdropper’s point of
view. A general analysis without relying on symmetry might require techniques from fractal set
theory. Symmetry as in the example above is simpler to analyze. To achieve this symmetry, the
association of quantizer messages to the code sets is crucial, an issue we have neglected here.
We also expect the gap between the left- and the right-hand side of (10) to decrease at higher
blocklengths, not least because the εn term in the lower bound at blocklength n = 1 and with
M = 3, λ = 1.2 as in the example equals 1.22 and is not negligible.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we introduced uncertain wiretap channels and their zero-error secrecy capacity.
We introduced methods from hypergraph theory which together with the already established
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Fig. 5. The ratio of the left- and right-hand side of (10) for different combinations of Ω and I0, with other parameters as in
the text.
graph theoretic methods for the zero-error capacity of uncertain channels facilitate the analysis
of zero-error secrecy capacity. We showed how the zero-error secrecy capacity of an uncertain
wiretap channel relates to the zero-error capacity of the uncertain channel to the intended receiver
of the wiretap channel. In the case that the uncertain channel to the intended receiver is injective,
we gave a full characterization of the zero-error secrecy capacity of the corresponding uncertain
wiretap channel.
We also analyzed how unstable linear systems can be estimated if the system state information
has to be transmitted to the estimator through an uncertain wiretap channel, such that the eaves-
dropper should obtain as little information about the system states as possible. We introduced two
security criteria, called d-security and v-security. We gave a sufficient criterion which uncertain
channels have to satisfy in order for the estimator to obtain a bounded estimation error as well
as both d- and v-security to hold. In the case of an injective uncertain channel from encoder
to estimator, we showed that this sufficient criterion essentially is necessary as well. We gave
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lower bounds on the exponential rates at which the eavesdropper’s state information diverges
under the two security criteria.
Some problems have been left open in the paper, like a complete characterization of the zero-
error secrecy capacity of uncertain wiretap channels, a characterization of when secure estimation
of unstable systems is possible over uncertain wiretap channels and a complete answer to the
question of optimality of the lower bounds from Lemma 2. Apart from that, there are several
points where the paper could be extended in the future. One would be that the encoder has
less knowledge about the uncertain wiretap channel. Another one would be an extension to
multi-dimensional secure estimation, possibly with distributed observations. Finally, it would
be interesting to link the zero-error secrecy capacity of uncertain wiretap channels to Nair’s
nonstochastic information theory [5] (cf. Footnote 4).
APPENDIX A
UNCERTAIN WIRETAP CHANNELS: PROOFS AND FURTHER DISCUSSION
This appendix contains the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 and sone additional discussion. First
we prove Theorem 1. For the proof of Theorem 2 we then introduce a graph and a hypergraph
structure on the input alphabet induced by the uncertain wiretap channel. Using these structures,
we prove Theorem 2.
1) Proof of Theorem 1: Assume that C0(TB,TC) > 0, which implies C0(TB) > 0. Let F
be a zero-error wiretap (n1,M1)-code and let G be a zero-error (n2,M2)-code, where M1 =
N(TB ,TC)(n1) ≥ 2 and M2 = NTB(n2). Consider the concatenated (n1 +n2,M1M2)-code F×G.
Clearly, it is a zero-error code. But it also is a zero-error wiretap code: Choose (m1,m2) ∈
{0, . . . ,M1 − 1} × {0, . . . ,M2 − 1} and choose c(1 : n1) ∈ Tn1C (F(m1)) and c(n1 + 1 : n2) ∈
Tn2C (G(m2)). Since F is a zero-error wiretap code, there exists an m
′
1 ∈ (F−1 ◦T−n1C )(c(1 :n1))
with m′1 6= m1. Therefore the two different message pairs (m1,m2), (m′1,m2) both can generate
the output c(1 :n1 + n2). Thus F×G is a zero-error wiretap code. This construction implies
logN(TB ,TC)(n1+n2)
n1 + n2
≥ logN(TB ,TC)(n1)+logNTB(n2)
n1 + n2
,
and the term on the right-hand side tends to C0(TB) as n2 tends to infinity. This proves Theorem
1.
2) Zero-Error Capacity and Graphs: It was observed by Shannon [2] that the zero-error
capacity of an uncertain channel T : A → 2B∗ can be determined from a graph structure induced
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on the input alphabet A by T. To see this, let n be a blocklength. Two words a(1 : n), a′(1 :
n) ∈ An cannot be used as codewords for the same message if they have a common output
word b(1 : n) ∈ Bn. If we draw a line between every two elements of An which generate a
common output message b(1 :n), we obtain a graph on An which we denote by G(Tn). Thus
G(Tn) is nothing but a binary relation ∼ on An, where a(1 : n) ∼ a′(1 : n) if and only if
Tn(a(1 :n))∩Tn(a(1 :n)) 6= ∅. Since the blocklength should always be clear from the context,
we omit it in the ∼-notation.
We call a family {F(0), . . .F(M − 1)} of disjoint subsets of An an independent system in
G(Tn) if for all m,m′ ∈ {0, . . . ,M − 1} with m 6= m′, we have a(1 : n) 6∼ a′(1 : n) for all
a(1 :n) ∈ F(m), a′(1 :n) ∈ F(m′). Clearly, every independent system consisting of M disjoint
subsets of A is a zero-error (n,M)-code for T and vice versa. Finding the zero-error capacity
of T therefore amounts to finding the asymptotic behavior as n→∞ of the sizes of maximum
independent systems of the graphs G(Tn).
Given two blocklengths n1, n2 and elements a(1 :n1 +n2), a′(1 :n1 +n2) of An1+n2 , note that
a(1 :n1 + n2) ∼ a′(1 :n1 + n2) if and only if one of the following holds:
1) a(1 :n1)=a′(1 :n1) and a(n1+1:n2)∼a′(n1+1:n2),
2) a(1 :n1)∼a′(1 :n1) and a(n1+1:n2)=a′(n1+1:n2),
3) a(1 :n1)∼a′(1 :n1) and a(n1+1:n2)∼a′(n1+1:n2).
We can therefore say that G(Tn1+n2) is the strong graph product of G(Tn1) and G(Tn2), see
[22, Definition 1.9.4]. In particular, G(Tn) is the n-fold product of G(T) with itself.
3) Zero-Error Secrecy Capacity and Hypergraphs: Let (TB,TC) be an uncertain wiretap
channel and n a blocklength. In order to use the above graph-theoretic framework for zero-error
capacity also in the treatment of the zero-error secrecy capacity of (TB,TC), we introduce an
additional structure on An, which is induced by TC . Every output c(1 :n) of TnC generates the
set e(n)(c(1 :n)) := T−nC (c(1 :n)) ⊆ An. We set E(TnC) := {e(n)(c(1 :n)) : c(1 :n) ∈ ran(TnC)}.
Every element e(n)of E(TnC) is called a hyperedge and the pair (An, E(TnC)) a hypergraph
denoted by H(TnC).
Now let F be a zero-error (n,M)-code for TB. Then by definition, it is a zero-error wiretap
(n,M)-code for (TB,TC) if and only if ]{m : F(m) ∩ e(n)} ≥ 2 for every e(n) ∈ E(TnC). In
other words, together with the above observation about zero-error codes and graphs we obtain
the following lemma.
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Fig. 6. (a): The pair (G(TB), H(TC)) corresponding to the uncertain wiretap channel (TB ,TC) from Fig. 2(b). The black,
solid line means that a2 and a3 are adjacent to each other in G(TB). The blue, dotted lines are the boundaries of the hyperdeges
of H(TC). (b): The number inscribed in each node indicates to which set F(m) the node belongs, where F is the zero-error
wiretap code defined in Fig. 2(b).
Lemma 8. A family {F(0), . . . ,F(M − 1)} of disjoint subsets of An is a zero-error wiretap
(n,M)-code for (TB,TC) if and only if it is an independent system in G(TnB) and if ]{m :
F(m) ∩ e(n)} ≥ 2 for every e(n) ∈ E(TnC).
Observe that every e(n) ∈ E(TnC) has the form e1×· · ·×en for some e1, . . . , en ∈ E(TC), and
that every Cartesian product e1 × · · · × en of elements of E(TC) is an element of E(TnC). This
means that H(TnC) is the square product of H(TC) (see [23]). For the uncertain wiretap channel
from Fig. 2(b), the corresponding graph/hypergraph pair at blocklength 1 and a zero-error wiretap
code are illustrated in Fig. 6.
4) Proving Theorem 2: Theorem 2 will follow from a slightly more general lemma which
holds for general wiretap channels. This lemma analyzes a procedure, to be presented next,
which eliminates elements a(1 :n) from An which do not satisfy a necessary condition for being
a codeword of a zero-error wiretap code. The idea behind the procedure is that by Lemma 8 no
a(1 :n) ∈ An can be a codeword which is contained in an e(n) ∈ E(TnC) which is a singleton or
where all elements of e(n) are connected in G(TnB). Thus these elements can be neglected when
looking for a zero-error wiretap code. This amounts to deleting those elements from the input
alphabet and to restricting the wiretap channel to the reduced alphabet. But not using a certain
subset of the input alphabet may generate yet another set of unusable input words. Thus a further
reduction of the input alphabet may be necessary, and so on, see Fig. 7. We now formalize this
procedure and analyze the result.
We apply the graph/hypergraph language developed above and start with introducing some
related terminology. Let (TB,TC) be an uncertain wiretap channel with input alphabet A. For
any subset A′ of A, one can consider the uncertain wiretap channel restricted to inputs from
A′, thus creating an uncertain wiretap channel (TB|A′ : A′ → 2B∗ ,TC |A′ : A′ → 2C∗) satisfying
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Fig. 7. (a): The original graph/hypergraph pair (G(TB), H(TC)) of some uncertain wiretap channel (TB ,TC). a1 cannot
be used in any zero-error wiretap code. (b): If a1 is not used in any zero-error wiretap code, then a2 is unusable as well. (c):
Having eliminated a1 and a2, there are no singletons or cliques left among the hyperedges.
TB|A′(a) = TB(a) and TC |A′(a) = TC(a) for all a ∈ A′. Thus, TB|A′ generates a graph
G(TB|A′) on A′ and TC |A′ generates a hypergraph H(TC |A′) on A′. If we say that we eliminate
a set V from G(TB) or H(TC), we mean that we pass from G(TB) to G(TB|A\V) or from
H(TC) to H(TC |A\V), respectively. Further, a clique in G(TB) is a subset V ⊆ A such that
a ∼ a′ for all a, a′ ∈ V . We write
E(G(TB), H(TC))s,c
:= {e ∈ E(TC) : ] e = 1 or e is clique in G(TB)}.
Finally, we can formalize the procedure of deleting some of the unusable input words from the
input alphabet of an uncertain wiretap channel. Let (TB,TC) be an uncertain wiretap channel
with input alphabet A and fix a blocklength n ≥ 1. For the sake of shorter notation, we use the
notation an for elements of An in the rest of the section. Put A(n)s,c (−1) = ∅ and for i ≥ 0 set
G(n)(i) := G(TnB|An\A(n)s,c (i−1)), (25)
H(n)(i) := H(TnC |An\A(n)s,c (i−1)), (26)
A(n)s,c (i) :={an: ∃ e(n)∈E(G(n)(i),H(n)(i))s,c : an ∈ e(n)}
∪ A(n)s,c (i− 1). (27)
Note that A(n)s,c (−1) ⊆ A(n)s,c (0) ⊆ A(n)s,c (1) ⊆ · · · . Define
I(n) := [min{i ≥ −1 : A(n)s,c (i+ 1) = A(n)s,c (i)}]+,
A(n)s,c := A(n)s,c (I(n))
where we set [x]+ = max{x, 0} for any real number x. Thus I(n) + 1 is the number of steps
of the procedure (25)-(27) where the input alphabet is strictly reduced. The reason for defining
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I(n) in the way we have done will become clear in the proof of Lemma 10 below. Since A is
finite, clearly I(n) <∞.
The next lemma says that not being an element of A(n)s,c is a necessary condition for any
an ∈ An to be the codeword of a zero-error wiretap code.
Lemma 9. If F is a zero-error wiretap (n,M)-code for (TB,TC) and any M ≥ 2, then
ran(F) ∩ A(n)s,c = ∅.
Proof: We use induction over the reduction steps i. Let M ≥ 2 and assume that F is a
zero-error wiretap (n,M)-code for (TB,TC). By Lemma 8 it is clear that ran(F) ∩ A(n)s,c (0) =
∅. Thus F also is a zero-error wiretap M -code for the reduced uncertain wiretap channel
(TnB|An\A(n)s,c (0),TnC |An\A(n)s,c (0)). In particular, if e(n) ∈ E(G(n)(1), H(n)(1))s,c, then e(n)∩ran(F) =
∅. Now note that the union of all e(n) ∈ E(G(n)(1), H(n)(1))s,c equalsA(n)s,c (1)\A(n)s,c (0). Therefore
ran(F) ∩ A(n)s,c (1) = ∅. Repeating this argument I(n) times, one obtains the statement of the
lemma.
The crucial point about the above elimination procedure is that one can relate A(n)s,c to A(1)s,c ,
which in turn will give us Theorem 2.
Lemma 10. For any uncertain wiretap channel (TB,TC) and every blocklength n ≥ 1, the
corresponding set A(n)s,c satisfies A(n)s,c = (A(1)s,c )n.
Before proving Lemma 10, we show how Theorem 2 follows from it.
Proof of Theorem 2: Observe that one can restrict attention to singleton zero-error wiretap
codes because the injectivity of TB implies that no vertices are connected in G(TnB) for any
n. Further, since H(TC |An\A(n)s,c ) has no singletons as hyperedges by construction of A
(n)
s,c , we
conclude that N(TB ,TC)(n) = (]A)n − ]A(n)s,c . By Lemma 10, we have ]A(n)s,c = (]A(1)s,c )n. Thus
if A(1)s,c is a strict subset of A, then
C0(TB,TC) = lim
n→∞
logN(TB ,TC)(n)
n
= log ]A.
Otherwise, C0(TB,TC) obviously equals 0. This proves Theorem 2.
Proof of Lemma 10: Fix n ≥ 2. We set σ := I(1) and define a mapping ι : A →
{0, . . . , σ} ∪ {∞},
ι(a) =
the i with a ∈ A
(1)
s,c (i) \ A(1)s,c (i− 1) if a ∈ A(n)s,c ,
∞ otherwise.
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We also define
ι(n)(an) = (ι(a1), . . . , ι(an)).
Similarly, for e ∈ E(TC) with e ⊂ A(1)s,c we set ι(e) := max{ι(a) : a ∈ e}, and for any
e(n) ∈ E(TnC) we define ι(n)(e(n)) = (ι(e1), . . . , ι(en)).
For any in ∈ ({0, . . . , σ} ∪ {∞})n we set
f(in) = {an ∈ (A(1)s,c )n : ι(n)(an) = in}, w(in) =
n∑
t=1
it
and for 0 ≤ µ ≤ nσ
F (µ) :=
⋃
in∈{0,...,σ}n:w(in)≤µ
f(in).
Note that F (nσ) = (A(1)s,c )n. We will now prove
F (µ) = A(n)s,c (µ) for 0 ≤ µ ≤ nσ, (28)
I(n) = nσ = nI(1). (29)
Together, (28) and (29) imply (A(1)s,c )n = F (nI(1)) = A(n)s,c , which is what we want to prove.
We first prove (28) by induction over µ. Let µ = 0. Then F (0) = (A(1)s,c (0))n. This is easily
seen to equal A(n)s,c (0).
Next let 0 ≤ µ ≤ nσ − 1 and assume (28) has been proven for all 0 ≤ µ′ ≤ µ. We need to
show that (28) holds for µ+ 1. First we show that F (µ+ 1) ⊆ A(n)s,c (µ+ 1).
Let in ∈ {0, . . . , σ}n with w(in) = µ+ 1. We have to show that f(in) ⊆ A(n)s,c (µ+ 1). Choose
an an with ι(an) = in. Then by (27), for every 1 ≤ t ≤ n, there exists an et ∈ E(TC) such that
an ∈ e(n) = e1 × · · · × en and ι(n)(e(n)) = in. Therefore
e(n) \ A(n)s,c (µ)
(a)
= e(n) \ F (µ)
(b)
= (e1\A(1)s,c (ι(e1)−1))×· · ·×(en\A(1)s,c (ι(en)−1)), (30)
where (a) is due to the induction hypothesis and (b) holds because et \ A(1)s,c (ι(et)) = ∅. By
definition of the mapping ι, every set et \ A(1)s,c (ι(et) − 1) is a singleton or a clique, hence
so is the right-hand side of (30). Thus e(n) \ A(n)s,c (µ) ∈ E(G(n)(µ + 1), H(n)(µ + 1))s,c, hence
an ∈ A(n)s,c (µ+ 1). This proves F (µ+ 1) ⊆ A(n)s,c (µ+ 1).
Now we prove that A(n)s,c (µ+1) ⊆ F (µ+1), which is equivalent to showing that An\F (µ+1) ⊆
An \ A(n)s,c (µ + 1). Let an ∈ An \ F (µ + 1). Thus an ∈ An \ F (µ) = An \ A(n)s,c (µ), where the
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equality is due to the induction hypothesis. We need to show that e(n) \ A(n)s,c (µ) 6⊆ A(n)s,c (µ+ 1)
for every e(n) ∈ E(TnC) containing an, since then an ∈ An \ A(n)s,c (µ+ 1).
Choose any e(n) = e1 × · · · × en ∈ E(TnC) containing an. Let in = ι(n)(an). Thus ι(et) ≥ it
for every t ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Choose any t∗ ∈ {1, . . . , n}. If 0 ≤ it∗ ≤ σ, there exists an a′t∗ ∈
et∗ \A(1)s,c (it∗ − 2) with at∗ 6∼ a′t∗ because otherwise, et \A(1)s,c (it∗ − 2) would be a singleton or a
clique in G(1)(it∗ − 1), hence a subset of A(1)s,c (it∗ − 1), which we know not to be true because
ι(et∗) ≥ it∗ . A similar argument shows that there exists an a′t∗ ∈ A \ A(1)s,c with at∗ 6∼ at∗ if
it∗ = ∞. Consequenctly, the sequence a˜n = (a1, . . . , at∗−1, a′t∗ , at∗+1, . . . , an) is an element of
e(n) satisfying an 6∼ a˜n because G(TnB) is the n-fold strong graph product of G(TB). Notice
that w(a˜n) ≥ w(an)− 1 ≥ µ + 1 because ι(a′t∗) ≥ it∗ − 1. In particular, a˜n /∈ F (µ) = A(n)s,c (µ).
Thus we have found two different an, a˜n ∈ e(n) \ A(n)s,c (µ) which are not adjacent to each
other, which implies e(n) \ A(n)s,c (µ) 6⊆ A(n)s,c (µ + 1). This is what we had to prove to show that
An \ F (µ+ 1) ⊆ An \ A(n)s,c (µ+ 1), and this completes the proof of (28).
To show (29), observe that (28) implies nI(1) ≤ I(n). If I(n) > nI(1) = nσ, then
E(G(n)(nσ), H(n)(nσ))s,c 6= ∅, i.e., there exists an e(n) = e1 × · · · × en ∈ E(TnC) such that
e(n) \ A(n)s,c (nσ) = e(n) \ F (nσ) is a clique or a singleton. But if e(n) \ F (nσ) 6= ∅, there exists
a t such that et \ A(1)s,c 6= ∅, which implies the existence of at, a′t ∈ et \ A(1)s,c with at 6= a′t and
at 6∼ a′t. If the t-th component of an ∈ e(n) equals at, then an /∈ F (nσ) = A(n)s,c (nσ). But then
a˜n := (a1, . . . , at−1, a′t, at+1, . . . , an) ∈ e(n) \ A(n)s,c (nσ) as well. Since an 6∼ a˜n, this implies that
e(n) \ A(n)s,c (nσ) is neither a clique nor a singleton. Thus I(n) = nI(1), which proves (29). This
completes the proof of Theorem 2.
5) Examples and Discussion:
Example 2. The uncertain wiretap channel (TB,TC) shown in Fig. 2(b) is an example of the
fact that at finite blocklengths n, non-singleton zero-error wiretap codes may be necessary to
achieve N(TB ,TC)(n). If one applies the zero-error wiretap code F = {{a1}, {a2, a3}, {a4}}, then
three messages can be distinguished at the intended receiver’s output and every eavesdropper
output can be generated by two different messages. Hence F is a zero-error wiretap (1, 3)-code.
On the other hand, the maximal M for which a singleton zero-error wiretap (1,M)-code exists
is M = 2, for example F = {{a1}, {a4}}. M = 4 is not possible because NTB(1) = 3. For
M = 3, either c1 or c2 would be generated by only one message.
We conjecture that non-singleton zero-error wiretap codes are also necessary to achieve
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Fig. 8. (a): An uncertain wiretap channel (TB ,TC). (b): A with G(TB) and H(TC). (c): A2 with G(T2B) and H(T2C).
Vertices connected by a solid black line are connected in G(TB) or G(T2B), respectively. Vertices within the boundary of a
blue dotted line belong to the same hyperedge of H(TC) or H(T2C), respectively. A zero-error wiretap (2, 4)-code is indicated
on the right-hand figure.
C0(TB,TC).
One can also construct examples which show the following: If there exists a zero-error wiretap
(n,M)-code, then it is necessary to have non-singleton codes to also find a zero-error wiretap
(M ′, n)-code for every 2 ≤M ′ ≤M .
Another open question is when the zero-error wiretap capacity of general uncertain wiretap
channels is positive.
Example 3. Consider the wiretap channel (TB,TC) from Fig. 8(a). Fig. 8(b) shows A with
G(TB) and H(TC) and Fig. 8(c) showsA2 with G(T2B) and H(T2C). The code shown in Fig. 8(c)
shows that C0(TB,TC) ≥ 1. Since C0(TB) = 1 by [2], we can even conclude C0(TB,TC) = 1.
Note that N(TB ,TC)(1) = 1. Thus the number of messages which can be transmitted securely
jumps from none at blocklength 1 to 4 at blocklength 2. This behavior is remarkable when
compared to the behavior of zero-error codes for uncertain channels: An uncertain channel T
has C0(T) > 0 if and only if NT(1) ≥ 2. This is a simple criterion to decide at blocklength 1
whether or not the zero-error capacity of an uncertain channel is positive. We do not yet have
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a general simple criterion for deciding whether the zero-error secrecy capacity of an uncertain
wiretap channel is positive. Of course, if TB is injective, then Theorem 2 provides such a
criterion.
APPENDIX B
PROOFS FROM QUANTIZER ANALYSIS
For reference, we note the following simple lemma which is easily proved by induction.
Lemma 11. Let µ be a real number and let y(0 :∞), v(0 :∞) be two sequences of real numbers
satisfying y(t+ 1) = µy(t) + v(t) for every t ≥ 0. Then for every t ≥ 0
y(t) = µty(0) +
t−1∑
i=0
µt−i−1v(i).
Proof of Lemma 3: Note that the quantizer set P(m(0 : t)) is an interval. Thus (13) implies
|I(m(0 : t+ 1))| = λ|P(m(0 : t))|+ Ω. Hence by (11)
|P(m(0 : t+1))|= |I(m(0 : t+1))|
M
=
λ
M
|P(m(0 : t))|+ Ω
M
. (31)
Therefore by Lemma 11,
|P(m(0 : t))| =
(
λ
M
)t
|P(m(0 :0))|+ Ω
M
t−1∑
i=0
(
λ
M
)t−i−1
=
(
λ
M
)t( |I0|
M
− Ω
M − λ
)
+
Ω
M − λ,
which proves (15). The other statements of the lemma are immediate from (15).
Proof of Lemma 4: Let m(0 : t) 6= m′(0 : t). It is sufficient to show that the minimal distance
between xˆ(m(0 : t)) and xˆ(m′(0 : t)) is lower-bounded by `t. By Lemma 5,
xˆ(m(0 : t))− xˆ(m′(0 : t)) = λt |I0|
M
t∑
i=0
m(i)−m′(i)
M i︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:n(m,m′,t)
. (32)
Since m(i) −m′(i) 6= 0 for at least one i ∈ {0, . . . , t}, the absolute value of n(m,m′, t) is at
least 1/M t. Thus by (32),
|xˆ(m(0 : t))− xˆ(m′(0 : t))| ≥ |I0|
M
(
λ
M
)t
. (33)
By Lemma 3, the right-hand side of (33) equals `t. Hence the lemma is proven.
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Proof of Lemma 5: Recall the notation I = [Imin, Imax] for real intervals I. For t ≥ 0,
xˆ(m(0 : t+ 1)) (34)
(a)
= I(m(0 : t))min +
(
m(t+ 1) +
1
2
)
`t+1
(b)
= λP(m(0 : t))min − Ω
2
+
(
m(t+ 1) +
1
2
)
`t+1
(c)
= λxˆ(m(0 : t))− λ`t
2
− Ω
2
+
(
m(t+ 1) +
1
2
)
`t+1
(d)
= λxˆ(m(0 : t))−λ`t
2
−Ω
2
+
(
m(t+ 1) +
1
2
)(
λ
M
`t +
Ω
M
)
= λxˆ(m(0 : t)) +
λ`t + Ω
2
(
2m(t+ 1) + 1
M
− 1
)
, (35)
where (a) is due to (11) and (12), (b) is due to (13), (c) is again due to (12) and (d) is due to
(31). Therefore,
xˆ(m(0 : t+ 1))
(e)
=λxˆ(m(0 : t))+
(
λt+1|I0|
2M t+1
− λ
t+1
2M t
Ω
M−λ+
λ
2
Ω
M−λ+
Ω
2
)
×
×
(
2m(t+1)+1
M
− 1
)
= λxˆ(m(0 : t)) +
1
2
(
λt+1
M t+1
|I0|+ ΩM
M − λ
(
1− λ
t+1
M t+1
))
×
×
(
2m(t+ 1) + 1
M
− 1
)
, (36)
where (e) is due to (35) and (16). Consequently,
xˆ(m(0 : t))
(f)
= λt
{
xˆ(m(0 :0))
+
1
2
t−1∑
i=0
1
λi+1
(
λi+1
M i+1
|I0|+ ΩM
M − λ
(
1− λ
i+1
M i+1
))
×
×
(
2m(i+ 1) + 1
M
− 1
)}
(g)
= λt
{
xˆ(m(0 :−1)) + |I0|
2
(
2m(0) + 1
M
− 1
)
+
1
2
t∑
i=1
(|I0|
M i
+
ΩM
M − λ
(
1
λi
− 1
M i
))(
2m(i) + 1
M
−1
)}
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= λt
{
xˆ(m(0 :−1))
+
1
2
t∑
i=0
(
ΩM
M − λ
(
1
λi
− 1
M i
)
+
|I0|
M i
)(
2m(i) + 1
M
−1
)}
.
where (f) is due to Lemma 11 and the recursion formula for xˆ(m(0 : t)) derived in (36) and in
(g) we applied (11) to find the relation between xˆ(m(0 : 0)) and xˆ(m(0 :−1)). This completes
the proof.
Proof of Lemma 6: Without loss of generality, we may assume that xˆ(m(0 :T )) > xˆ(m′(0 :
T )). Then it is sufficient to show that if (18) is satisfied, then xˆ(m(0 :T +t))− xˆ(m′(0 :T +t)) ≥
`T+t for all t ≥ 0. We have
xˆ(m(0 :T + t))− xˆ(m′(0 :T + t))
(a)
= λt
{
xˆ(m(0 :T ))− xˆ(m′(0 :T ))
+λT
T+t∑
i=T+1
(
Ω
M−λ
(
1
λi
− 1
M i
)
+
|I0|
M i+1
)
(m(i)−m′(i))
}
(b)
≥ λt
{
xˆ(m(0 :T ))− xˆ(m′(0 :T ))
−λT (M−1)
T+t∑
i=T+1
(
Ω
M − λ
(
1
λi
− 1
M i
)
+
|I0|
M i+1
)}
= λt
{
xˆ(m(0 :T ))−xˆ(m′(0 :T ))− Ω(M−1)
(M−λ)(λ−1)(1−λ
−t)
− λ
T
MT
( |I0|
M
− Ω
M − λ
)
(1−M−t)
}
(37)
where (a) is due to Lemma 5 and (b) holds because m(i)−m′(i) ≥ −(M − 1) for all i. Thus
one obtains
xˆ(m(0 :T + t))− xˆ(m′(0 :T + t))− `T+t
λt
(38)
(c)
≥ xˆ(m(0 :T ))− xˆ(m′(0 :T ))
− Ω
M−λ
(
M−1
λ−1 (1−λ
−t)− λ
T
MT
(1−M−t)+ 1
λt
− λ
T
MT+t
)
− |I0|
M
(
λT
MT
(1−M−t) + λ
T
MT+t
)
= xˆ(m(0 :T ))− xˆ(m′(0 :T ))
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− Ω
M − λ
(
M − 1
λ− 1 (1− λ
−t)− λ
T
MT
+
1
λt
)
− |I0|
M
λT
MT
. (39)
where (37) and Lemma 3 were used in (c). Since we want (38) to be positive for every t ≥ 0,
it is sufficient by (39) to have
xˆ(m(0 :T ))− xˆ(m′(0 :T ))
≥ max
t≥0
{
Ω
M−λ
(
M−1
λ−1 (1−λ
−t)− λ
T
MT
+
1
λt
)
+
|I0|
M
λT
MT
}
=
Ω
M − λ
(
M − 1
λ− 1 −
λT
MT
+ 1
)
+
|I0|
M
λT
MT
(d)
=
Ω
M − λ
M − 1
λ− 1 + `T ,
where (d) is due to Lemma 3. Thus the inequality holds if (18) is satisfied, which proves the
lemma.
Proof of Lemma 7: If we can show
xˆ(mξ(1:j−1)ξ(j)(0 :jT − 1))− xˆ(mξ(1:j−1)ξ′(j)(0 :jT − 1))
>
Ω
M − λ
M − 1
λ− 1 + `jT−1, (40)
for every j ≥ 1, every ξ(1 : j − 1) ∈ {1, . . . , γ}j−1 and every ξ(j), ξ′(j) ∈ {1, . . . , γ} with
ξ(j) > ξ′(j), then the claim of the lemma follows from Lemma 6. We have
xˆ(mξ(1:j−1)ξ(j)(0 :jT − 1))− xˆ(mξ(1:j−1)ξ′(j)(0 :jT − 1))
(a)
=λjT−1
jT−1∑
i=(j−1)T
(
ΩM
M−λ
(
1
λi
− 1
M i
)
+
|I0|
M i
)
mξ(j)(i)−mξ′(j)(i)
M
(b)
≥ Ω
M − λ
λT − 1
λ− 1 +
( |I0|
M
− Ω
M − λ
)
λjT−1
M (j−1)T−1
1−M−T
M − 1
(c)
=
Ω
M − λ
M − 1
λ− 1 + `jT−1 +
Ω
M − λ
λT −M − λ+ 1
λ− 1
+
( |I0|
M
− Ω
M − λ
)(
λ
M
)jT−1
MT −M
M − 1
=:
Ω
M − λ
M − 1
λ− 1 + `jT−1 + AjT , (41)
where (a) is due to Lemma 5, (b) uses mξ(j)(i)−mξ′(j)(i) ≥ 1 which holds due to the choice of
ξ(j), ξ′(j), and Lemma 3 was used in (c). It remains to show that AjT ≥ 0. Since λT ≥M+λ−1
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for T satisfying (19), this is clear in the case that |I0|/M ≥ Ω/(M − λ). Otherwise, we lower-
bound AjT by AT , for which we have
AT +
Ω(M + λ− 1)
(M − λ)(λ− 1)
≥ Ω
M − λλ
T
(
1
λ− 1 −
M
λ(M − 1)
)
(d)
≥ Ω
M − λ
λ(M − 1)(M + λ− 1)
M − λ
M − λ
λ(λ− 1)(M − 1)
=
Ω(M + λ− 1)
(M − λ)(λ− 1)
where (d) is due to (19). This implies AT ≥ 0, hence AjT ≥ 0 for all j ≥ 1. With (41), this
implies (40) for all choices of j, of ξ(1 : j − 1) and of ξ(j) > ξ′(j) and hence completes the
proof of the lemma.
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